A response to Snell The learning organization: Fact or fiction?
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A B S T R AC T
Snell in his article in this issue has argued that the moral basis of the learning organization is comprehensively and systematically at odds with the moral foundations of the conventional organization. In this article, this critique of the learning organization is taken a step further. It is argued that, as defined by its proponents, the learning organization is limited by conventional organizational structures and hierarchy, by organizational cultures that frequently encourage anti-learning values and routines, and by shared structures of organizational cognition. It is argued that the learning organization also overlooks the extent to which standards of rationality within organizations arise from dominant external discourses of government and organization.
K E Y W O R D S learning organization organization organizational cognition organizational cultures organizational structures
Snell has done us a service. Bravely -if somewhat unusually -Snell has chosen to critique the notion of the learning organization from an ethical perspective. This is laudable and impressive. All too frequently ethics, when they are invoked at all in organizational analysis, are raised only to be forgotten in actual analyses and assessment. But this author is serious, and uses an ethical perspective effectively and comprehensively in an assessment of the LO. I agree entirely with the author's conclusions, which are important and deserve attention.
However, I am concerned that the full implication of his conclusions may not be immediately apparent, partly because the use of an ethical approach and the language of ethics may cause readers to miss their fullest significance. And this would be a pity for the conclusions are important. They are stark and clear: '. . . the moral foundations required for these LO characteristics to emerge and be sustained, tend to be absent. . .' But the achievement of the LO is not only counter to prevailing ethical structures: it is also counter to organizational structures, and cultures.
I agree with the author and his conclusions. But I wonder if we could have reached these conclusions by other routes, and I am not convinced that the ethics approach was necessary or even particularly useful in helping the author to reach his conclusions.
It is tempting to dismiss the LO. It's so easy: it can seem simplistic, poorly researched, poorly conceptualized, hopelessly unrealistic. But we must try not to reject it out of hand. As a number of writers who have commented on similar consultancy-based ideas and theories have pointed out: the fact that they are popular with managers and associated with consultancy activity does not necessarily mean they are not serious and important (Guest, 1990; Wood, 1989) . It is possible that, as David Guest remarked about Tom Peters' excellence argument, it may be right enough to be dangerously wrong (Guest, 1992) .
In fact, the learning organization is an important idea; more important than many academic commentators realize. It merits attention. This is because it is central to current thinking about organizational change and performance, and because it actually contains an important and provocative suggestion. But its importance is not the importance it claims.
The contemporary manager is flooded with advice; and the contemporary organization is exposed to unprecedented quantities and programmes of change, some of which reflect this advice. The learning organization movement has a place in this advice and practice. It inspires it and legitimates it and informs it. The LO is important as an idea. This is one aspect of its importance.
Broadly speaking, there are currently available three distinct approaches to the improvement of organizational capability. There is the 'fit' literature (Legge, 1989; Mabey et al., 1998) , which argues that capability must be redesigned to support and be consistent with (whatever that means) new strategies built on assessment of market and industry dynamics. This comes in 'open' and 'closed' versions, the first contingent and variable, and the second absolute or universal. This latter includes the 'best practice' elements discussed by Huselid (1995) and Becker and Huselid (1998) . There is also the resource-based approach, which argues the merits of building strategy on existing core competences or capabilities that include not only production technologies, but also value chain management capabilities.
But it's the third approach that interests us here. This defines both 'fit' and resource-based approaches as static, episodic and hierarchic -dependent on occasional changes of strategy and organization in response to senior management decision-making. It argues that these approaches assume a predictable and known environment; that they depend upon the quality of strategic thinking of the dominant coalition; that they tend to be responsive rather than proactive and to follow industry trends rather than lead them. And it asserts that these approaches assume a hierarchic model of change in which a small group of senior managers (the centre) design change for the majority (the line units) who wait to be told what to do. Although this third approach is not always called the learning organization, in essence this is exactly what it is. This third approach to organizational capability focuses on the organizational features necessary to produce an organization capable of relating as a whole to the environment in an alert, speedy and intelligent manner. The LO thesis argues the merits of achieving an organization that is alert, adaptable, intelligent, responsive. It asserts that traditional monolithic, centralized, hierarchic organizations, in which design is separated from execution -which were geared for repetitive transactions and routine activities -are being replaced by 'flexible and agile organisational forms which can accommodate novelty, innovation and change . . . Rapid change demands quick reactions and continuous re-calibration' (Bahrami, 1998: 184-9) .
A number of authors have described this type of organization. The language is very similar:
Why do some companies continually create new forms of competitive advantage while others watch and follow? Why do some companies redefine the industries in which they compete while others take the existing structures as given? (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993: 76) Competition is now a 'war of movement' in which success depends on anticipation of market trends and quick responses to changing customer needs. Successful competitors move quickly in and out of products, markets and sometimes even entire businesses . . . In such an environment the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company's products and markets but the dynamics of its behaviour. (Stalk et al., 1992: 62) A final example:
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The ability of a company to learn should be under regular scrutiny . . . the ability of an organisation to reconstruct and adapt its knowledge base . . . should be a key task for managers. They should also be able to apply the 'unlearning' test. In other words, is the organisation capable of mounting the creative destruction necessary to break down outmoded attitudes and practices . . . The ability to learn faster than competitors may be an organisation's only sustainable advantage. (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991: 290) The essence of this approach to improving organizational capability is a view of a new form of relationship between organization and environments. As Senge comments, 'At the heart of a learning organisation is a shift of mindfrom seeing ourselves as separate from the world, from seeing problems as caused by someone or something "out there" to seeing how our actions create the problems we experience. A learning organisation is a place where people are continually discovering how they create their reality' (Senge, 1990b: 12-13 ). Senge's (1990b) notion of the learning organization shares many features with Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) 'knowledge creating company ' and Quinn's (1992) 'intelligent enterprise'. It's not difficult to see the appeal of this argument. Both the 'fit' and resource-based approaches assume an alert senior management cadre capable of anticipating and understanding environmental developments and then being able to redesign the organization quickly and efficiently to ensure its compatibility with strategy. But the LO approach argues the merits of achieving a total organization that is endlessly capable of re-inventing itself in response to unpredictable environments. The LO doesn't have to be made to change and adapt: it does it 'naturally' as an organism adapts naturally to changes in environment.
The appeals of the metaphor of the LO are obvious. It draws not only on a strong underlying link to evolutionary dynamics, but also on long-term historical interest in organization analysis in flexible adaptive organizational structures, and in learning in organizations. The LO approach also draws on the value placed upon enterprise in contemporary discourses of organization (du Gay, 1991 (du Gay, , 1996 du Gay & Salaman, 1992; Miller & Rose, 1993; Rose, 1995) . Enterprise is a key concept in contemporary approaches to organizational change. It acts as a central relay device between organization and employee and external environmental forces. It thus asserts the importance of exactly the same sort of necessary linkage between these elements as prescribed by the LO thesis. It also defines both organization and employee as actively and autonomously committed to the achievement of flexible, responsive relationships with clients and employers.
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Finally, like enterprise, the notion of the learning organization conflates individual and organizational levels of analysis, and assumes that one reflects and supports the other. Like enterprise, the LO approach defines organizations in terms of individual attributes. So the LO approach shares many of the elements of the discourse of enterprise but sanitizes the concerns and priorities of enterprise, by replacing an overtly commercial, market focus with the gentler psychological developmental language of learning.
But, while we may understand the appeal of the LO thesis, we must also understand its practical limitations. And this is where Snell makes a major contribution. Because, although his paper is firmly located within an ethics framework, his conclusions are in effect a resounding critique of the practical limitations of the LO approach.
Again and again, his conclusions imply that the sort of arrangements necessary to achieve an LO are contrary to normal prevailing arrangements within organizations. Snell suggests, in effect, that learning is at odds with key features of organization. This is crucially important.
In order to explore the practical feasibility of the LO, it is necessary to identify the organizational features associated with, or assumed and required by, the achievement of the LO. Snell overviews these. Other overviews have been offered by Jones and Hendry (1994); Pedler et al. (1991) ; Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) . Many of these commentators note the daunting demands of the LO. Pedler et al. note that the achievement requires that 'the basic assumptions and values underpinning reward systems are explored and shared', and 'all members of the company take part in policy and strategy formation' (Pedler et al., 1991: 26-7) . However attractive the idea of the LO might be, it seems prima facie that it might be systematically at odds with many of the core features of the modern organization.
And this is a conclusion many commentators have reached. For some, the issue is the conflict between learning and the fact of organization itself. 'Organising and learning are essentially antithetical processes which means the phrase "organisational learning" qualifies as an oxymoron. To learn is to disorganise and increase variety. To organise is to forget and reduce variety' (Weick & Westley, 1996: 440) . Others have approached this via a distinction between types of learning. Various writers using various dichotomies have distinguished learning that involves adjustment around the existing situation from learning that addresses and changes underlying assumptions (Hedberg, 1981; Kirton, 1976; Senge, 1990a) . The first involves correcting errors; the second involves addressing the sources of the problems or errors. Argyris, who has contributed enormously to this area, notes that the more radical form of learning -which is essential to the achievement of the LO -raises issues of politics, deference and resistance within an organization. Indeed, Salaman The learning organization 3 4 7
with Schon, he recognizes the antithetical relationship between double loop learning and organization: 'organisations tend to create learning systems that inhibit double loop learning that calls into question their norms, objectives and basic policies' (Argyris & Schon, 1978: 10) . In short, they argue, organizations have institutionalized barriers to the sort of radical learning identified by Pedler et al. as essential to the achievement of the LO. They have learnt not to learn. This assertion requires further discussion. It is central to our analysis of the feasibility of the appealing notion of the LO. It is useful to organize this evaluation under two headings: internal and external constraints.
As Weick and Westley (1996) note, it is important when admiring the virtues of the LO to remember that many core features of organization are either inimical to or at odds with it. Persistence and stability are extremely powerful realities of organizational life. Furthermore, the structuring of organizations defines boundaries and levels. Horizontal boundaries establish areas of specialism and focus; vertical levels differentiate power and rewards. These structural principles will generate systematically sectional priorities which in turn generate differentiated priorities and interests -politics. Politics influence the flow and distortion of data, the development of priorities, the possibility of deference and careerism. Many researchers have noted this. 'Each group fights to preserve and enlarge the area over which it has discretion, attempts to limit its dependence upon the other groups . . . The group's freedom of action and the power structure appear to be clearly at the core of these strategies' (Crozier, 1964: 156) .
Structures not only establish sectional priorities and loyalties, they also interfere with, and distort the flow and nature of, information: organizational boundaries become informational barriers. Divisions divide. Even Argyris, whose analyses mostly focus on the role of interpersonal skills and behaviour in achieving learning, notes that organizational factors influence the possibility of achieving learning: 'One is the degree to which interpersonal, group, inter-group, and bureaucratic factors produce valid information for the decision-makers to use to monitor the effectiveness of their decisions. The other is the receptivity to corrective feedback of the decision-making unit' (Argyris, 1976: 365) .
This political aspect of organizations would clearly impact on three major features of the LO as set out by Snell: C1 'Free exchange in, across and between communities of practice'; C2 'Networked knowledge and experience'; and C5 'Open dialogue'.
Hierarchical structuring introduces a new barrier to learning: strong motivation to distort, divert, censor data. It also introduces the values of conformity and deference. The results have been well described by Janis (1982) Human Relations 54(3) 3 4 8 in his classic analysis The victims of groupthink which, although it focuses on group dynamics, identifies a number of organizational 'antecedents of groupthink' which include factors like 'pressures towards uniformity' which clearly derive from the impact of hierarchy.
There are numerous available examples of the role of hierarchy in encouraging behaviour and attitudes that obstruct learning, specifically with respect to environmental analysis. (See, for example, Janis, 1982; Presthus, 1979; Roberts, 1992; Valentin, 1994.) History supplies us with many other examples where hierarchy influenced the ability of an organization to understand its environment. A particularly awful one is the battle of the Somme. While still at the planning stage, numerous confusions and difficulties occurred: French commitment was steadily reduced, the location of the attack and its objectives were a muddled compromise. During the preparations for the attack, further problems emerged: the barrage was insufficiently focused, and the extent of damage was not assessed. The official history records the attitude of the planners:
Increasing optimism was shown by Haig as the day of the battle drew nearer, though French resources and consequently their share were steadily shrinking owing to the drain of Verdun. What is perhaps more remarkable is the way his chief subordinates joined in the chorus of optimism, singing so loudly as apparently to drown the doubts they had felt during cool consideration of the problem. They did not meekly defer to his judgement; they made it their own. Loyalty could go no further.
Privately, Rawlinson was convinced that they [Haig's plans] were based on false premises and too great an optimism. Yet he impressed on all at conferences and other times . . . that nothing could exist at the end of the bombardment in the area covered by it. (Hart, 1972: 237) Also important as potential obstructions to the achievement of the LO are the cultures which exist within organizations. These are significant in two ways: as normative or cognitive systems. The normative components of organizational cultures are relevant to the achievement of learning to the extent that they supply norms and values that define how managers relate to each other and specifically their willingness collectively to challenge each other, review, analyse, reflect. Shared values of deference towards authority, unwillingness to confront embarrassing issues of error or failure, unease at radical or creative ideas are likely to reduce the Salaman The learning organization 3 4 9 possibility of achieving the LO. Snell notes that the LO requires that managers 'challenge assumptions without invoking defensiveness . . . gently confront themselves and their staff with the need for reality testing' (Snell, 2001) . Hierarchy typically encourages values and expectations of conformity; leadership usually discourages contradiction; groups usually reward loyalty. Managers learn deference towards authority and interpersonal relations are ordered in ways that reflect organizational values of loyalty and mutual support. Bate (1984) illustrates the ways in which shared values can restrict learning. He describes one organization's culture, which induced a shared unwillingness to confront a shared view of shared problems:
The culture, once established, prescribes for its creators and inheritors certain ways of believing, thinking and acting which in some circumstances can prevent meaningful interaction and induce a situation of 'learned helplessness' -that is a psychological state in which people are unable to conceptualise their problems in such a way as to be able to resolve them. In short, attempts at problem-solving may become culture bound. (Bate, 1984: 214) Cultural norms may inhibit organizational learning. So may shared structures of knowledge that managers apply to data analysis. Managers within organizations actively engage in structured and shared attempts to understand and explain what is happening. Organizations per se involve shared ways of constructing reality (Gioia, 1986; Gioia & Poole, 1984) . Sackmann (1992) has argued that organizational cultures involve collective sensemaking and has usefully identified four aspects of this. 'Dictionary knowledge' consists of shared definitions and labels. 'Directory knowledge' defines how things work. 'Recipe knowledge' is more theoretical and prescriptive: it suggests what needs to be done for things to be improved. 'Axiomatic knowledge' draws on deep-seated assumptions and underlying premises (Sackmann, 1992: 142) . Any of these may have implications for organizational learning by offering theories or recipes which determine which data are collected and how they are analysed: how and if learning occurs. Numerous other authors have described the shared theories or recipes made available by organizational cultures and their role in obstructing organizational learning. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) talk about the 'dominant management logic' within organizations, which suggests that what managers know and how they think results from their accumulated (and shared) experience. Weick (1979) has used the expression 'cause maps' as a way of describing how members of organizations share frameworks, which they use to Human Relations 54(3) 3 5 0 translate chaotic reality into a version whereby cause and effect are located and understood. The concept refers to the subtle ways in which members share ways of making sense, and sharing and communicating sense. Berger and Luckmann (1966) note the importance of the ways in which the organizational order makes sense to participants by defining how things should be put in place. Mastering these 'recipes' is one of the first and most important achievements for the organizational newcomer.
The important point about these and many other writers is that they all share an interest in identifying and understanding the organizational 'recipes', the shared cognitive structures or 'schema' which offer established ways of thinking, the taken-for-granted assumptions, the unacknowledged core assumptions which set limits for what can be thought about and how, and which establish the limits of the possible, the discussible and the imaginable. 'Shared meaning, shared understanding and shared sense-making are different ways of describing culture. In talking about culture we are really talking about a process of reality construction that allows people to see and understand particular events, actions objects, utterances or situations in distinctive ways' (Morgan, 1988: 24) . In order for managers to make their world meaningful, they have to simplify it, develop rules of thumb or recipes.
The implication of these schemata is that managers learn to focus their analyses and to minimize data processing time through the use of shared recipes which achieve speedy responses and some efficiencies but that these routines become counter-productive under new or changed circumstances (Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1990) . The outcome has been described by Starbuck and others: shared structures of organizational learning may lead to the application of shared cognitive routines which are historically based but irrelevant for future success. 'The older, larger and more successful organizations become, the more likely they are to have a large repertoire of structures and systems which discourage innovation while encouraging tinkering' (Van de Ven, 1986: 596) .
The problem with such cognitive schemata is that they may obstruct the ability of the organization to learn by restricting environmental analysis, or by influencing how data are analysed. A number of empirical studies confirm this possibility. Snell (2001) notes that within the LO managers 'surface and test mental models . . . helping to expose hidden assumptions in mental models'. But Lant et al. (1992) and other researchers have explored the factors that hinder or encourage management learning: open-mindedness, flexibility, propensity for critical review and evaluation.
They identify the possibility that 'structural inertia' limits managers' willingness to recognize when a performance issue arises or reduces their willingness radically to reorient their organization, and they note the ways Salaman The learning organization 3 5 1 in which managers' interpretations of past performance may lead them to miss or misunderstand key environmental developments and thus fail to initiate radical change through misattributing the causes of organizational failure. Barr et al. (1992) analysed the mindsets of senior managers of similar railway organizations in the US over a 25-year period. One organization changed radically and survived; the other ended in bankruptcy. The study gathered data on the use of new concepts, the abandoning of old concepts, the development of new ways of thinking and new mental maps. Although the mental constructs of managers in both organizations were originally similar, they changed over time. 'All the indicators in mental maps supported the hypothesis that more rapid change in mental maps was associated with organizational renewal and survival. The surviving organization changed its mental model on all measures far more rapidly than the one that eventually declined' (Sparrow, 1994: 14) . Interestingly, the declining organization did not fail to notice the situation but failed to respond and accommodate to it quickly enough.
Such phenomena are likely to obstruct the achievement of a key feature of the LO. As Snell (2001) notes, within the LO, senior managers 'surface and test mental models, "challenging assumptions without invoking defensiveness" (Senge, 1990b: 14) . They balance inquiry with advocacy, distinguish between espoused theory and theory in use, are sensitive to defensive routines and gently confront themselves and their staff with the need for reality testing, helping to expose hidden assumptions in mental models with reality' (Senge, 1990b: 14-15) .
Researchers have also identified the ways in which organizations make available ways of defining, or even enacting (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985) , the business environments, and that these definitions vary with national, sector or business context (Calori et al., 1992; Daniels et al., 1994) . Sparrow, who summarizes much of this literature, notes that the literature on organizational cognitive processes attends to the ways in which organizations consist of underlying cognitive boundaries that managers use to make sense of the world (Sparrow, 1994) . A large and rapidly growing body of work suggests that, at a senior level within organizations, processes of environmental analysis (which are seen as critical to the achievement of the LO) are influenced by classification processes which structure the ways in which managers see, define and organize data of their environments (Calori et al., 1992) . Others have argued that managers' classifications of their environments should be seen in terms of 'enactments', the creation of their environments through shared sensemaking. Managers may create their environments -constitute them -and then respond to these enactments in ways that make them real Human Relations 54(3) 3 5 2 (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985) -a process identified long ago by Berger and Luckmann (1966) . Such a possibility conflicts with the need within the LO for managers to engage in 'generative learning, questioning basic assumptions about self and others, the nature of the organization and its environment' (Snell, 2001) .
Researchers have also noted how emotional factors (Allbrow, 1994; Daniels, 1999; Fineman, 1996) and data overload (Weick, 1995) may also contribute to distortions in organizational decision-making and learning. It is possible too that recent fashions in management restructuring have exacerbated congenital tendencies towards impaired learning. 'Downsizing' may also damage the 'psychological contract' within an organization or generate feelings of mistrust, anger or resentment that will also impact on employees' willingness to participate energetically in the activities and processes that underpin learning. The emotions generated within organizations and by recent forms of organizational change are unlikely to encourage the sort of attitudes and feelings necessary to underpin the LO model. The LO would, as Snell (2001) notes, 'treat employees with compassion'.
This second source of limitation on the achievement of the LO requires us to move the focus from the internal working of organizations to the relationship between organizations and their societal, ideological content. The achievement of the LO is limited not only by internal structures, cultures and shared cognitive schemata, but also by external ideological factors which constrain and structure the ways in which managers define and think about organizational problems and possible solutions. The LO concept assumes that managers respond to environmental and other cues by open-minded analysis of all options by unrestricted forms of analysis: LOs are 'distinguished by the free and open flow of ideas and know-how' (Snell, 2001) . Many organizational and contextual factors limit this possibility by supplying powerful established modes or logics of analysis.
Many widely accepted organizational standards of rationality which determine how managers define and respond to issues derive from and depend on certain cognitive and political contexts which render these ideas and assumptions natural and powerful.
There are two strands to this argument. First, within any particular society or period, accepted ideas about organizational structures and theories of organizational functioning are influenced by prevalent fashions in management thinking. Organizational learning is thus limited by available and acceptable 'theories'. Kieser (1997) , Abrahamson (1996) , Guest (1992) , Gill and Whittle (1993) and others have noted the cyclical and fashion-based nature of popular thinking on organizational matters. Others have noted how ideas seen as attractive and true owe Salaman The learning organization 3 5 3 their power (and application) to their resonance with prevalent societal values (Clark & Salaman, 1998; Fineman, 1996) . Managers' decisions about internal organizational processes and priorities are influenced (possibly in some areas determined) by external environmental factors and priorities. These authors argue that many programmes of organizational change are inspired by efforts to demonstrate the modernity and efficiency of the organization in terms of prevailing standards and fashions. This requires that organizations demonstrate their adherence to and compliance with whatever are currently seen as the canons of modernity and efficiency -regardless of their actual value -or that they develop a shadow organization and double standards, one for internal use and the other for external display. Second, systems or bodies of ideas prevalent within a society at a particular period differ fundamentally and affect the criteria and priorities, options, modes and analysis, and assumptions of managers, all of which impact on how, when and if organizational learning occurs. Economic historians and academics who have taken a cross-cultural approach to organizational analysis have been arguing this point for many years. A striking example of this is the particular characteristics of the approach to the management of labour of UK employers and how this differs from other management approaches. Ron Dore 30 years ago in a classic study of British and Japanese factories argued that each country used a strikingly different approach to management. The UK approach was a market-based one, with labour seen as a commodity like any other commodity, and where legislation operated to maintain the unencumbered labour market. The philosophy of laissez-faire was seen as necessary to the efficiency of labour markets as to other markets. On the whole, the British employer was not interested in developing an elaborate management system and instead relied on the market. The Japanese system in contrast adopted a more managerial, paternalistic approach where the vicissitudes of an external labour market were replaced by an internal system which sheltered employees and supplied considerable security, promotion ladders and welfare benefits (Dore, 1973) .
Each system had its own logic (and many argue its particular consequences for organizational performance and labour relations). Each distinctive national system or ideology of management and organization had fundamental implications for management decision-making on a range of issues: organizational structure, business strategy, investment policy, labour relations, wage systems, and many more. And each system became, for those within it, something natural and obvious, beyond discussion, taken-forgranted. It is this phenomenon that this section addresses: the ways in which pervasive ways of thinking current within a society and an epoch come to dominate the nature and possibility of organizational learning. For, if the Human Relations 54(3) 3 5 4 achievement of the LO depends on managers recognizing and confronting 'Fixed truths' (Snell, 2001 ) and making 'multiple interpretations and understandings' available, then the well-researched existence and implications of pervasive logics of organization will clearly seriously undermine the possibility of the LO.
Some have used the notion of discourse to explore these issues. Discourses of organization are historically grounded. This means that what is seen as true is true only within a particular historical discourse -a 'regime of truth': discourses of organization construct and define organizations. They determine how they can be talked about, what are seen as problems and as solutions to problems. They define, therefore, what can be learned and what objects can be learned about. These discourses therefore govern the way in which organizations -or aspects of organizations, or their environmentscan be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. Furthermore, discourses define what can be talked about: 'Just as discourse "rules in" certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write or conduct oneself, so also by definition, it "rules out", limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it' (Hall, 1997: 44) . As Stuart Hall has argued, the perceived 'truth' of a body of ideas does not follow from its correspondence with objective reality or other truth tests but from its dominance within a particular regime. In organizational matters, ideas are not powerful because they are true; they are true because they are powerful:
Truth isn't outside power . . . Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regimes of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the type of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned. (Foucault, 1980: 131) The logics and assumptions and theories that managers use when seeking to achieve their purposes, however right and natural and true they may seem to the managers and to others, are in fact aspects of a regime of truth, temporally and culturally specific, and their apparent strength and solidity are a result of their authority, not their truth. This clearly conflicts significantly with the claimed prerequisites of the LO. In the LO, truth arises not from power or regimes of truth but from logic, analysis, mutuality, openness. Learning organizations, Snell (2001) notes, 'entertain multiple, socially
Salaman The learning organization 3 5 5 constructed realities and discourses with no single, final, all-embracing, authoritative, orthodox version of truth'.
Conclusion
The learning organization is a powerful and attractive idea. It owes its appeal less to its practicality and more to its resonance with widely prevalent values and discourses of organization and management. The LO allows an elegant and appealing convergence of three key ideas. First, it includes the value of organizational flexibility and responsiveness, defined in opposition to the claimed dysfunctions of bureaucracy. Second, it subsumes the discourse of enterprise with its critical role within a dominating discourse of the market as a moral, cleansing force -a discourse which itself acts as a relay between economy, organization and individual. And, third, the LO invokes and emphasizes liberal values of learning, individual development and growth. And it argues not only the merits of these elements but also their inherent inter-connectedeness. But, like Snell, I have argued that the mass of evidence suggests that the LO is seriously at odds not with the ethics prevalent within the modern organization but with multiple realities of organization as we know them, at the structural and cultural (normative and cognitive) levels. This doesn't mean that the LO is therefore unimportant -simply a dream. First, dreams are important: the LO undoubtedly plays a role in inspiring or rationalizing a whole range of organizational change projects. But, more significantly, the LO may be useful in surfacing and causing us to confront and assess the nature and the adequacy of current forms of organization. It may be the case that the LO and current forms of organization are seriously at odds. I think they are. This could cause us to reject the notion of the LO. Or, more usefully, it could encourage us to try to re-imagine the very nature and form of the work organization.
